Ascertaining intention: In interpreting words of statute or doc, 1st duty is to ascertain intention behind words expressed by considering the words as stated and not by reading the legislative intention into the enactment, where plain meaning is absurd be given secondary meaning through limited power of adding or subtracting what is necessarily implied by the words to arrive at intelligible meaning.
Traditional common rule – 3 basic rules (Literal or plain meaning – Golden – Mischief rules)
Cross on Interpretation – 3 rules of Eng. CL statutory interpretation – Ordinary or technical meaning in its context – Secondary meaning where absurdity may arise – Read in words which are necessary implied by words therein, to prevent unintelligibility, unworkableness, unreasonableness and absurdity; May resort to aids of construction and presumptions.
Literal:
Intention of legislators, from natural meaning of the words, technical words strictly given their technical meaning, not to go outside of the text, Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co (1920) per Huggins J statute is to be expounded according to 1-intent of parliament making it 2-intent derived from words not outside 3-words given ordinary and natural or technical sense even if it will result in inconvenience 4-court not concerned about its results only its meaning.
Technical words be given their technical meaning, Monta-supra, per Smith v US
Secondary meaning: if literal leads to absurdity, word be given any other meaning apart from ordinary, Sam v Comptroller-supra Ababio-supra, Darke IX v Darke IV context in which word is found may be strong enough to show that it’s intended to other than its ordinary meaning
Golden:
Ordinary grammatical meaning of words, unless absurdity or inconsistency will arise with the rest of statute or document, ordinary meaning modified to avoid absurdity Grey v Pearson (1857) per Lord Wensleydale,
Mischief:
Essence of rule is to draw attention to reason or purpose behind legislation [through 4 things 1-What was the CL before Act was passed? 2-Mischief and defect the common law didn’t provide? 3-What remedy parliament has resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth? and 4-True reason for the remedy], interpret to suppress mischief, and interpret to supress mischief per Heydon’s case (1584)
Consider word of statue in its context, Context being preamble, other provisions of statute, existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, and the mischief which the statute is intended to clear per Nankoja v Mbage (89-90) Owusu Sekyere J.
Appiah v Biani on whether an uncompleted house is a house under s4 of PNDCL111 and therefore devolves on wife and children, per Lutterodt J a house literally means a place for dwelling, thus must have a roof wall and windows and an uncompleted house to lintel level won’t qualify as a house, as the Act didn’t define house to fulfil the legislative intent house should be defined as any building occupied or intended to be occupied whether residential or commercial, interpretation of statute, gen principle is give words ordinary meaning, where ambiguity arises be given mechanical or grammatical meaning by going into the mischief which gave birth to statute, looking at letter and spirit of the law, adopt purposive approach that law intends not merely to provide shelter or dwelling but starting spouse and children off financially well by giving them larger portion of deceased’s estate.
Ascertaining intention: Denning in Seaford Court Estates Ltd v Asher not only from language of statute but also social conditions which gave rise to it and mischief to remedy, ask the question how would the makers have straightened the ambiguity in the statute? and what is and what is not in the sentence that is defeating the true intention of its maker?
Court’s discretions:
To substitute a word for another: In Riberro v Riberro (89-90) financial provision for divorced wife is inclusive of both money and immovable property though section 20(1) of MCA made it financial provision or immovable, thus ‘or’ interpreted by substituting with ‘and’.
Resort to the context: Tuffour v AG (1980) on shall be deemed, other provisions where shall be deemed has been used, thus context from the statute itself, though not appointed as president shall for the purpose of the provision be the president, and therefore bears the meaning as same used in other parts of the 1969 constitution.
Not permissible to put in glosses or interpolations: Rep v Commissioner of Income Tax per Georgina Wood CJ, that the court or judges must refrain from legislating under the guise of interpretation.
Technical words be given its technical meaning: Monta v Patterson Simons Gh. Ltd. Per Mensah Boison, where Act is passed in respect of a business or trade, technical words familiar to those engaging therein must be given their technical meaning else the intention of the legislature cannot be ascertained.
Resort to the secondary meaning of the word or phrase. Sam v Comptroller of Customs and Excise per Taylor J, being a reformulation of the Golden Rule means that any meaning given it to achieve the intent outside its ordinary meaning where but for such, absurdity, incongruity and uncertainty may arise in achieving the intent of the framers.
In Ababio v The Rep, Mensah Boison refers to the plain and where will not effectuate legislative intent be given any reasonable meaning or secondary meanings per Cross as could bear from the context as the two competing principles of construction. Secondary meaning given ‘any person’ to connote any chief but those who were demoted as paramountcy and were specified in schedule.
Resort to necessary implied amendment (Ommisus Casus): General Cold Industry Ltd v Standard Bank of GH Ltd Taylor J, at CL the court may alter or substitute or import words necessary to effectuate the intent or may disregard the express words at all where intelligibility will be seen. The court cannot however substitute the word company for industry to affect plaintiff company as part of the companies whose assets have been seized by the state and the error can’t be rectified by the court and it is for parliament to amend the non-existing company to affect plaintiff.
In Mekkaoui v Minister of Internal Affairs, Crabbe held that omission to insert commencement date of Act revoking plaintiffs’ citizenship cannot be corrected by the court, that in Act of parliament the court has no omissus casus power, to insert date of commencement date of AFRCD 42 revoking. However, in Rep v HC, Ex Parte Adjei, Adade JSC-who dissented in Mekkaoui case-held that the court by interpretation may correct the errors of the draftsman. That duly constitution of the SC to hear a matter by virtue of fall in number below 4 or 5 doesn’t affect its existence as absurdity will be created when interpreted as such and that COA or HC judges may be invited any time to decide cases at the SC whether or not number falls.