The tort seeks to protect a person’s interest in freedom from physical restraint (i.e. protects freedom of movement) and therefore the right to move about freely and apparently also the plaintiffs belief in this freedom. This right is also protected by articles 14, 15, 21(l)(g); (2); (4); and (5) of the Constitution, 1992. As a trespass, the act which causes the restrain must be direct and must be intentionally done by the defendant. Whether it can be negligently caused will be dealt with later. Further. The act must cause the confinement of the plaintiff to an area delimited by the defendant.
False imprisonment is founded on two ingredients:
(a} imprisonment (b) absence of justification. “False” simply means erroneous, wrongful or unlawful and not untruthful. “Imprisonment” should not bring a prison to mind. The term is used loosely to denote a confinement any place. Neither physical contact nor anything resembling prison is necessary.
Imprisonment has thus been said to be in: “the restraint of a man’s liberty, whether it be in the open field, or in the stocks or cage, or in the gaol. And, in all these places, the party so restrained is said to be a prisoner, so long as he hath not his liberty freely to go at all times to all places whither he will, without bail or main prize.” Termes de la Ley.
Thus in Warner v. Riddiford, the defendant, a beer-house operator, employed the plaintiff to carry on his business at weekly wages determinable, under the agreement, on a month’s notice. The defendant gave the plaintiff a week’s notice, checked the accounts and asked the plaintiff to make up the difference. The plaintiff refused on the ground that he had not been given the stipulated months’ notice. The defendant brought in two police officers. One of the officers, when the plaintiff tried to go upstairs, refused to allow him to do so. Later, he was allowed to go accompanied. When he persisted in refusing to make the difference, he was taken into custody and charged with embezzlement. He was discharged. The plaintiff then brought the action for false imprisonment.
The judge, in his direction to the jury, told them that they had to consider three questions: whether there was any imprisonment by whom?; and any legal justification for it? on (1) he told them: “to constitute an imprisonment, it was not necessary that the person should be locked up within four walls, but that, if he was restrained in his freedom of action by another that was an act of imprisonment, and that the way in which the plaintiff had been constrained in his own house and the restraint put upon his person by refusing him permission to leave the room and go upstairs in his own house, was in itself an imprisonment…”
On appeal, this direction was held to be a correct statement of the law.
The restraint in order to amount to imprisonment must be total.
In other words, the person must be confined in all directions. If it is only partial, leaving a reasonable means of escape, then no false imprisonment has occurred. A case in point is Bird v. Jones‘.
In that case, the defendant blocked one side of the Hammersmith Bridge to form a grandstand for a boat race, thus preventing the plaintiff’s passage. The plaintiff refused to cross by the opposite path. It was held that there was no false imprisonment because he had reasonable means of leaving. The plaintiff was not restrained in every direction; therefore the restraint was not total.
Another example is Wright v. Wilson: In this case, A’s chamber adjoins to B’s chamber and has a door that opens into it by which there is a passage to go out. A has another door which C stops, so that A cannot go out. It was held that there was no false imprisonment, because A may go out by the door in B’s chamber. He will be a trespasser, but can sue C in an action on the case. C.J. Holt stated that an auction in false imprisonment will fail when a man has two doors through which he can go out and one is blocked, leaving the other free, though the second one, he can go through only as a trespasser, But an escape route which exposes A to danger is unreasonable and amounts to false imprisonment.
This decision raises the following question: What do we mean by the means of escape being unreasonable. For example: Merely to fail to facilitate the departure of a person from one’s premises does not amount to false imprisonment.
In Herd v. Weardale Steel, Coal and Coke Coy., a miner went down into the defendant’s coal mine on the agreement that he would work for a fixed time and, at the expiration of that time, he would conveyed to the surface by means of machinery supplied by the employers. He stopped work earlier in breach of his contract and demanded to be conveyed to the surface at once. The employers refused and he remained in the mine till the agreed closing time. In an action for false imprisonment, it was held that he had no cause of action because the miner had no right to use the machinery whenever he wants. Therefore, for the period he remained in the mine till the end of his regular shift, he had not, in law, been imprisoned. So if A enters a train or a bus, the doors are locked and it stops only at certain points, if it stops for some reason in between, A cannot demand to be allowed go out there. If he demands and is refused, this is no false imprisonment.
Again in Robinson v. Balmain New Ferry Coy Ltd.,’ the defendants-respondents carry on and operate the business of a harbour steam ferry between Sydney and Balmain. They had a wharf on the Sydney side of the ferry and you had to enter by a turnstile and go out by another if you want. The appellant entered the wharf intending to cross to Balmain by one of the steamers. Discovering that the next steamer would come in twenty minutes time, he decided to leave but refused to pay the toll at the exit turnstile (one penny). After some struggle, he succeeded in leaving. He brought an action for false imprisonment; judgment was given against the company. It appealed and succeeded. On further appeal by the appellant to the Privy Council, it was held that the toll imposed was reasonable, so no liability in false imprisonment. It was held further that failure to provide gratuitous exit from the premises to the appellant did not constitute false imprisonment.
From this case we can conclude that a passenger on a tro tro; train, plane etc. cannot demand to get off at an unscheduled point. However, this case must not be treated as implying that you can detain people to enforce a contract. In Sunbolf v. Alford the defendant innkeeper detained the plaintiff-customer for not paying his bill. It was held to be false imprisonment.
False imprisonment can thus take place-anywhere — in the plaintiffs own house, in the mine, on a bridge or highway. Wherever the place, the requirements are that the plaintiff should be totally restrained in a place whose boundaries are delimited by the defendant.
Imprisonment can result from words or acts or both. So consider the following two situations: (a) A visits the boyfriend B at his apartment; then informs B that their affair is over. B starts screaming and threatening to create a scene, if A leaves the apartment. This goes on for ten minutes. False imprisonment? (b) A points a loaded gun at B and says “Don’t move” — False imprisonment?
Must the plaintiff be aware of the restraint to succeed?
Two cases generally considered as stating two different positions on this point may be discussed here. In the first case, Herring v. Boyle, the plaintiff, suing by his next friend, was an infant of ten years. He was in the defendant’s school during holidays. When the school vacated, his mother came to take him home for a few days but the defendant refused saying he would not let him go until some money owed to the school had been paid. He would not let the mother see the child cither. After persistent demand and refusal, a writ of habeas corpus was taken out. The plaintiff was then released and taken home by his mother. No proof was given that the plaintiff knew of the earlier denial to his mother; neither was there any evidence of actual restraint on him. He also appeared to have enjoyed it. It was held that there was no false imprisonment of the plaintiff.
The second case was Meeting v. Graham-White Aviation Co., per Warrington, L.J. and Lord Atkin, Lord Atkin took the view that consciousness of the confinement was irrelevant to the question of false imprisonment. For the sake of the full import of that case, the two opinions are reproduced here in full.
Warrington L.J. said “This is an appeal by the defendants from a judgment delivered by Bray, J. after trial before himself with a special jury in an action for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The jury found, speaking, for the moment, quite generally, in the plaintiffs favour, both on the issues of false imprisonment and on the issues raised in the action for malicious prosecution, and awarded the plaintiff 250/ damages in respect of false imprisonment, 1250l for malicious prosecution, and an additional 200l, defending the plaintiff against the charge of larceny which had been preferred against him, and which was the subject of the alleged malicious prosecution.
The defendant’s appeal both in respect of the findings of the jury against them on the issues of false imprisonment and on the findings of the jury and judgment of the learned judge on the issues raised by the action for malicious prosecution. And they originally appealed against the award of the 200/ in respect of the father’s costs of defending the plaintiff. But that particular objection has been withdrawn. Therefore, if we are in the plaintiffs favour on the question of malicious prosecution, the damages will stand as they were found by the jury — namely, 1250l, with the addition of 200l, for the costs. I propose to state generally, without going into the details of the evidence, the facts of this case, and then to take in detail the questions asked of the jury and their answers, and see whether there was evidence on which the jury could properly come to the conclusion that they did. It will then be necessary to see, having found those facts, whether the learned judge in the court below was right in finding, as he had to find, that there was an absence of reasonable and probable cause.
The plaintiff is an infant, and at the date of the occurrence in question he was between eighteen and nineteen years old. He was employed at the Graham White aviation works, the aerodrome, at Hendon. His father was a merchant, carrying on business in the City, and having a residence at Finchley, not far from the Hendon aerodrome. The boy had had 100l premium paid for him by his father to the defendant company; he had obtained a pilot’s certificate; and he had also, I gather, acquired a considerable amount of experience as a mechanic in the company’s works, so much so that at the time of the occurrences in question he was designing an aeroplane of his own.
Whether it was a good or a bad design is of no consequence. But he was engaged in designing an aeroplane of his own. For that purpose he, of course, required a certain amount of materials and tools of such a nature as were possessed by the defendant company. He applied to one of the officials of the defendant company, a gentleman of the name of Liddle, as to the possibility of obtaining certain materials and tools from the defendant company, and he was told there was a difficulty about it, but that he might ,apply to Martin, who was the chief storekeeper of the defendant company and it was possible that he might be able to obtain at any rate some of the things he wanted
The plaintiffs home was with his father at Finchley. But inasmuch is he being a pilot and instructor in the aviation school at Hendon, sometimes found him necessary to be up quite early in the morning, he occupied a bedroom in a cottage called Rose Cottage, occupied by a man named Lamb, the cottage being ,Wi outside the ground of the aerodrome. So matters were with regard the plaintiff.
There had been for some considerable time extensive thefts of material and other things from the defendant company, and those representing the defendant company were much exercised about the same, and were clearly very anxious to stop it. On the 26th Jan. 1918 certain verbal statements were made by two pilots in the employ of the defendant company, a man named Russell and a man named Somersfield, to one or more of the amateur police who were employed at the works, and who may be conveniently referred to as the works police. This was reported to the managing director, and he desired to have their statements put in writing. They were put into writing. They consist of the two statements dated the 28th January which have been so frequently referred to in the course of the argument before us.
The effect of those two statements – I do not propose to read them at length – seems to me to be that a certain keg of varnish had been traced to the possession of the plaintiff, that it had been first placed in one of the hangars on the aerodrome ground; that it had been removed by the plaintiff from that hangar to another; and that it had afterwards been moved from the aerodrome ground altogether to Rose Cottage, and the persons who made the statements had heard that it had been or was about to be taken from Rose Cottage to elsewhere With that particular incident connected with the varnish there was associated in those statements the name of the plaintiff, the name of Martin the storekeeper, and Mr. Brackenridge, who was the head of the school as I understand, or, at any rate, a very important person in the aviation school and who it was said knew at all events all about the original removal of the varnish to the hangar, although it was said that he had taken no notice of the incident.
The other matter which the two statements suggested was a supposed intimacy between Martin and the plaintiff. It was said that they were in association; that die plaintiff had frequently taken Martin up for flights in hi aeroplane, and the suggestion obviously was that Martin and die plaintiff were much too friendly with each other.
Having received those written statements, which, by the way arc addressed to Mr. Grahame-White, the managing director of the company’ Mr. Grahame-White, after consultation with the authorised police officer merely with his own works’ police, but the authorised officers of the Metropolian Police — decided on applying to the magistrate for a search warrant. Application was made to the magistrate on an information which was sworn by Hutchins who was secretary of the company. T
hat information, which is dated the 30 Jan 19 is was in these terms: “During the past three months, November, December, and January, a considerable quantity of aeroplane material comprising sheet steel brass bolts and sockets, wood and fabric, also varnish and petrol have been stolen from the Grahame-White Aviation Company’s works. From information I have received in statement form and supplied to me by the police” — by the police there he means his own works’ police “I have every reason to believe, and do believe, that considerable quantities of the said stolen property have been taken to the address of one of the firm’s assistant store-keepers, Charles Lamb, Rose Cottage, Collindeeplane, Hendon. I respectfully ask that a search warrant be issued for the purpose of searching the said house.”
At that time, so far as the facts of this case are concerned, the only thing that there was reason to believe had been taken to Rose Cottage was the keg of varnish. That was the thing as to which the defendant company had the written information. However, the magistrate granted the search warrant, and, in addition to it merely being a search warrant, it authorised also the arrest of Lamb. The search warrant was placed in the hands of two detective officers of the Metropolitan Police, Askew and Burgess, and on the 5th Feb. it was executed by them in the presence of officers of the defendant company.
The result of that search was that there was found in the bedroom occupied by the plaintiff a bundle of things called turnbuckles, about a dozen of them, and there was also found in the same bedroom a bundle of what are sometimes called wire strainers and sometimes short ends. Both of them are connected with the construction of aeroplanes. There was found in the drawer of the kitchen, with which, so far as I know, the plaintiff was not at all connected, two small coils of wire. In a chest in the stable, as to which it was not shown that the plaintiff had any connection whatsoever; they found some more wire, and, what is most important of all, they found an inner tube with the defendant company’s name upon it, that tube belonging to the under-carriage of an aeroplane. They found also in this chest in the stable a varnish brush and a piece of sheet brass, a small piece only, apparently part of what had been a larger piece, which was stamped with the defendant company’s identification mark, and which, no doubt, had been the property of the defendant company.
Besides these articles the police found on the premises — and I understand in that pail of the premises with which the plaintiff had to do — a number of tools and material connected with the manufacture of aeroplanes, but which things the defendant company or the officers of the defendant company could not identify as theirs. They also found in the bedroom occupied by plaintiff — and this is a matter of great importance — drawings and sketches of the aeroplane which he was manufacturing.
The police having made their search arrested Lamb. They then inquired at what time it was likely that the plaintiff would be back again at the cottage. He was not at the cottage at the time, nor, so far as we can see, was he upon the aerodrome ground at the time. This was about six o’clock. They ascertained the address of his father. They were told that the plaintiff himself would most likely be back at the aerodrome at about nine o’clock. They did not make any appointment with him, but it was known — and this is of some importance — to the works’ police that the two detectives, Askew and Burgess, wished to question the plaintiff, and that they expected that he would be there about nine o’clock.
Hutch ins and Hickie — whose name I have not mentioned before, and who was the superintendent of the works’ police — with the two detectives then went off to the house of the plaintiff’s father. What took place there I will leave for the moment, because I wish to deal with what happened to the plaintiff.
Prudence, who was a sergeant of the works’ police, had been told it was desired to interrogate the plaintiff at the defendant company’s offices, and that he was, when he came back, to inform of the fact, and see if he could, that he should be at the defendant company’s office for that purpose. Prudence interpreted and carried out his instructions in this way. He told two of the company’s police, a man named Dorry and a man named Liddington, to convey this information to the plaintiff. Dorry and Liddington saw the plaintiff come out of the works and go across the field towards this cottage. They say they saw him signal with an electric torch and receive an answer from the cottage. They then started off, one way and one the other. Liddington went straight across the field towards that part of the hedge against which was the curtilage of the hedge against which was the curtlings of the cottage. The other man went off to the left and down a lane by a footpath which led in the same direction. But the point is that two men commissioned by a third to convey a message to the plaintiff thought it necessary to do so in this extremely elaborate way.
Dorry got to the cottage asked for the plaintiff. He saw him and told him that his presence was desired up at the works, and the plaintiff said: “All right, I will get my mackintosh and I will come along.” So they started, and the plaintiff suggested that they had better go a short cut through a place in the fence separating the aerodrome from the cottage, and there was found the other constable, Liddington. They all three went up to the defendant company’s offices together. The plaintiff was taken or invited to go to the waiting room of the offices there to wait until he was wanted. Prudence, Dorry, and Liddington were due to go off duty at eight o’clock in the evening. It was then past eight, and, therefore, they were at liberty to go off duty. But they were told that it was desired that they should remain on duty until the Metropolitan detectives had come back. They accordingly remained on duty, and they remained in the immediate neighbourhood of the waiting room in which the plaintiff was.
Meanwhile Prudence had communicated by telephone with the detectives and with Hickie and Hutchins who were in their company that they had the plaintiff at the works. The detectives and Hickie therefore returned to the defendant company’s works, and one of them, in giving his evidence before the police magistrate, said that he there found the plaintiff detained. The plaintiff had, however, when he was first taken to the waiting room, asked what he was there for, what they wanted him for, and said that if they did not tell him he should go away. They then told him that what they wanted him for was to make inquiries because there had been things stolen and he was wanted to give evidence. On that statement he stayed. Askew and Burgess with Hickie then arrived at the defendant company’s offices after the interview that they had had with the plaintiffs father, and, therefore, for the moment I will leave what took place subsequently, and consider what was the effect of what had already taken place with reference to the plaintiff and the question of his imprisonment.
The learned judge in the court below asked the jury this question in reference to it: “Had the plaintiff been detained in the waiting-room before the detective and Hickie arrived?” Answer: “Yes.” On behalf of the defendant company it was contended before us that there was no evidence that the plaintiff had been detained in the waiting-room before the detectives and Hickie arrived. They say that he was perfectly free to go where he liked, and that he knew he was free to go where he liked, that he could have gone away if he pleased: he did not desire to go away, and, accordingly, that he was never under any compulsion or under anything which could amount to an imprisonment. In my opinion there was evidence on which the jury might properly come to the conclusion that from the moment that the plaintiff had come under the influence of these two men, Dorry and Liddinglon, he was no longer a free man.
It was said by one of them, I think it was by Dorry, at the trial, that he was very anxious that the plaintiff should come from the cottage to the works at the earliest moment, as he did not want him to be at the cottage and find out what had taken place in the execution of the search warrant. I should be inclined to draw an inference in favour of the view which the jury have expressed from the fact that when so simple a matter as sending a message down to the plaintiff that he was wanted up there was concerned, that they should have taken the trouble to employ three people, a police sergeant and two constables, to convey that message to the plaintiff. Then, again, that the message should be conveyed by the two constables in the way in which it was conveyed; that one should go round one way and one should go another; that one should approach the cottage by the lane and footpath, and that the oilier should approach it by the aviation grounds. I cannot resist the conclusion that they meant to intercept the plaintiff.
Then they accompanied him together across the ground and when he was in the place the sergeant communicated with the detectives, and told them that they had got him there. Having got him there, and having got him there with a view to satisfying the desire of the detectives expressed before they left for Finchley, that they should have him there to interrogate, can anybody believe that they were not keeping him there until the arrival of these detectives?
In addition to that is the fact that the other two constables Dorry and Liddington, and Sergeant Prudence as well, though really entitled to go off duty, were kept there until the arrival of the detectives. Why were they kept there? What had they to do? What had they to do if it was not intended in some way to restrict the movements of the plaintiff— I do not mean to say at some future time to arrest him, but it was intended then to keep control over his will and over his movements.
To my mind there was ample evidence justifying the conclusion to which the jury had come, agreeing in that respect with Askew’s own opinion, that the plaintiff had been detained by the officers of the company. If that had been so, then it is admitted that that act was a wrongful imprisonment, because it was an imprisonment by a private person, and a private person has not the privilege which a constable has of imprisoning a man on mere suspicion that a felony has been committed. I think therefore that that was a correct finding of the jury, and that what they found was a false imprisonment.
Then they were asked a further question: “Were the detectives when they formally arrested the plaintiff in the waiting-room acting as agents and with the authority expressed or implied of the defendants?” They did arrest the plaintiff under circumstances which I will mention directly when I come to that part of the case, because they bear more on the question of malicious prosecution than upon the question of wrongful imprisonment. One of the detectives, Burgess, did in fact arrest the plaintiff. Were they acting as agents, and with the authority, express or implied, of the defendants? The jury answered that in the affirmative that they were. Now there, I think, the jury had no evidence on which they could properly come to that conclusion. The evidence satisfies me, first, that Mr. Grahame-White, the managing director, left the question to Mr. Hutchins, the question as to what should be done with reference to the prosecution, and may be said almost to have washed his hands of it as soon as he directed the application for the search warrant, and that Hutchins and Hickie the works’ superintendent of police, and the other two officers of the company, were quite alive to the fact that, so far as the arrest was concerned at all events, they almost throw the responsibility upon the constables of the Metropolitan Police.
I think that that evidence satisfies me that the officers of the defendant company did not give the plaintiff in charge, but that in that matter the Metropolitan Police acted on their own responsibility, and by virtue of the powers which were conferred upon them as police constables. That being so, the arrest of the plaintiff by them was not wrongful, because I think that they had at the time they arrested him sufficient reasonable ground for suspecting that a felony had been committed, and that the plaintiff had been involved in the commission of that felony. I think, therefore, that die arrest by the Metropolitan Police was not wrongful, was made on their own responsibility, and not as agents of the defendant company.
That being so, but for which Mr. Gregory has said on the plaintiffs behalf a very difficult question would be involved, because the jury have made no distinction between the damages incurred by the false imprisonment which only lasted something under an hour, and the subsequent formal arrest and its consequences. But Mr. Gregory, on the plaintiffs behalf, has agreed that, there being no wrongful imprisonment by the arrest on the part of the police constables, the only wrongful imprisonment being that by the officers of the company for a short time in the waiting-room, we may reduce the damages awarded by the jury to a nominal sum. That accordingly I think ought to be done. That will dispose of the question of wrongful imprisonment.
ATKIN L.J. said: I think that we are obliged to take it that the issue as to false imprisonment raised on the pleadings was extended by the assent of both parties to an allegation that the plaintiff had in fact been falsely imprisoned at the works of the defendants before he was formally arrested by the detective sergeant. In respect of that it is said that that, after all, cannot be true because the plaintiff himself never supposed that he was imprisoned at the time. He used language which indicated that he was intending to go away if the persons who were proposing to see him and to take his evidence did not come soon. Therefore it is said that inasmuch as the plaintiff did not know that he was being imprisoned it is not possible that there could be evidence that he was imprisoned. I think that the case is important when that contention is to be dealt with, because it seems to me upon a review of the possibilities of what is meant by imprisonment, that it is perfectly possible for a person to be imprisoned in law without his knowing the fact and appreciating that he is imprisoned.
It appears to me that a person could be imprisoned without his knowing it. I think a person can be imprisoned while he is asleep, while he is in a state of drunkenness, while he is unconscious, and while he is a lunatic. Those are cases where it seems to me that the person might properly complain if he were imprisoned, though the imprisonment began and ceased while he was in that state. Of course, the damages might be diminished and would be affected by the question whether he was conscious of it or not.
So a man might in fact, to my mind, be imprisoned by having the key of a door turned against him so that he is imprisoned in a room in fact although he does not know that the key has been turned. It may be that he is being detained in that room by persons who are anxious to make him believe that he is not in fact being imprisoned, and at the same time, his captors outside that room may be boasting to persons that he is imprisoned, and it seems to me that if we were to take the case as an instance supposing it could be proved that Prudence had said while the plaintiff was waiting: “I have got him detained there waiting for the detective to come in and take him to prison” — it appears to me that would be evidence of imprisonment. It is quite unnecessary to go on to show that in fact the man knew that he was imprisoned.
If a man can be imprisoned by having the key turned upon him without his knowledge, so he can be imprisoned if, instead of a lock and key or bolts and bars, he is prevented from, in fact, exercising his liberty by guards and warders or policemen. They serve the same purpose. Therefore it appears to me to be a question of fact. It is true that in all cases of imprisonment so far as the law of civil liability is concerned that “stone walls do not a prison make,” in the sense that they are not the only form of imprisonment, but any restraint within defined bounds which is a restraint in fact may be an imprisonment.”
Article 14(5) of the Constitution, 1992 provides:
“Any person who is unlawfully arrested, restricted or detained by any other person shall be entitled to compensation therefore from that other person.”
Does this statement imply a constitutional choice between the two contending schools of thought? Cf. Date-Bah ” and Veitch. ” On balance, we are entitled to agree with Veitch that the provision is capable of supporting cither school. The framers must be taken to have known the existence of the controversy but chose not to take sides. In the end, a better reconciliation would be to treat the issue of consciousness as an award issue. If the plaintiff is aware, then he is entitled to higher compensation. If not, nominal damages may be justified.
Problems relating to the requirement of directness
An arrest often involves or results in restraint on a person. An unlawful arrest therefore constitutes false imprisonment e.g. I go to a police station on my own free will or at the invitation of an officer, then get arrested unlawfully — this is false imprisonment]. Where A instigates the police to arrest B, if the arrest becomes unlawful, A is liable for false imprisonment because it is the direct act of A, which caused the arrest in those circumstances. If, however, A informs the police about a state of affairs, they institute their own investigations and arrest B, then there is no false imprisonment, even if the arrest so effected is unlawful because the arrest docs not result from the direct act of A. It is not often easy to make the distinction between informing and directing.
For the proper test here, see Thomas Bingham M.R. in Davidson v. Chief Constable:”Whether what [the informer] did went beyond laying information before police officers for them to lake such action as they saw fit and amounted to some direction, or procuring, or direct request, or direct encouragement that they should act by way of arresting….”
In Onogen v. Leventis, the plaintiff was a store-keeper of the defendant company, in charge of the company’s drinkables and provisions store at Market Circle in Takoradi. It appeared that the company lost 70 cases of Heineken beer and the general agent of the company informed the police. The plaintiff was arrested and detained for 26 hours before being granted bail. Subsequently, he was prosecuted and was acquitted. He then brought an action for false imprisonment, wrongful dismissal and malicious prosecution. Adumua-Bossman J (as he then was) quoted Salmond on Torts, (10th ed.), at p. 374 with approval as follows: “An action for false imprisonment will lie against any person who authorises or directs the unlawful arrest or detention of the plaintiff by a merely ministerial officer of the law. …
He makes that ministerial officer his agent and is responsible for any arrest or detention so procured or authorised, as if it were his act. It is necessary, however, even in such a case to prove actual direction or authorisation, such as is sufficient to make the ministerial officer the agent of the defendant. Mere information given to such an officer, on which he acts at his own discretion, is no ground of liability. So no false imprisonment.”
But in Austin v. Dowling, the plaintiff was a lodger in the defendant’s premises. It appeared he owed some money, was sued and paid. But he still owed a small sum. One day, when he returned to his lodgings, he discovered that the drawers in his bedroom had been emptied and his private cupboards and their contents removed. He went to report at Clifton Police Station and was accompanied back at his request by a police officer. At the house the plaintiff demanded from the defendant’s wife his property and was refused. The plaintiff went upstairs, broke the door of a bed-room in the defendant’s house occupied by another lodger with his shoulders and a screw-driver.
When he returned downstairs, the defendant’s wife handed the plaintiff over to the police for the felony of breaking open the door. He was taken into custody and walked lo the police station. After hearing the circumstances of the case, the inspector in charge declined to detain the plaintiff unless the defendant signed the charge sheet. The defendant signed the charge sheet. The plaintiff was charged with “feloniously breaking and entering into a bed-room” in the defendant’s house. The plaintiff was detained for 171/2 hours before being brought before magistrates where he was discharged. He brought action for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution and was non-suiled. He appealed. Willes J, Keating J, and Montague Smith J said there was evidence of false imprisonment because, signing the charge sheet after police say: no detention unless so signed, amounts to authorising the police to imprison the plaintiff— it was the doing of an act which caused the plaintiff to be kept in custody.
This case must be distinguished from a situation where A offers the police mere assistance to do their work. Thus in Nkrumah v. Foli. It was held that accompany the police to point out the plaintiff to them is not instigation. Again in Amadjei v. Opoku Ware, ‘ two policemen on patrol duty were told by the respondents that A,B,C,D and E were holding an unlawful meeting and should be arrested. When the police were interviewing the appellant, the respondents came and ordered their arrest, whereupon one policeman said “You are arrested.” The plaintiff brought the action for false imprisonment. The high Court dismissed the action. Upon appeal, it was held that the facts disclosed authorisation by the respondents of the appellants’ arrest and unlawful detention. So it amounts to false imprisonment and the appeal was allowed.
So where a complainant gives information to a police officer, and the officer acts according to his own judgment and makes an arrest, the complainant incurs no liability for false imprisonment. But where the complainant does not merely give information but directs the officer lo effect the arrest, the officer in that case is considered as the servant of the complainant and the complainant will be liable for false imprisonment — Narwu v. Armah.
The situation will not be different where the information given by A to the police is to his knowledge false. Musa v. Limo-Wulana shows where the information given by A to the police is to his knowledge false, an action in false imprisonment will lie:
(a) Is the law looking for intention to imprison or intention to do the act leading to imprisonment? In Warner v. Riddiford, it was held that the relevant consideration was intention to do the act which causes or results in the imprisonment,
(b) Can the false imprisonment be committed negligently? Sayer’s case suggests only intentionally.