WHAT IS CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION?
The general rule of interpretation is that words should be given their literal or grammatical meaning and documents should be construed as a whole. Where literal or grammatical meaning may result in as absurdity, a secondary or technical meaning may be given, thus the purposive approach. A purposive approach to construction of an enactment according to Bennion in Statutory Interpretation, 4th Ed (2002) 810 is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by
1. Following the literal meaning where the meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose (purposive and literal construction) or
2. Applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose (a purpose and strained construction)
There are two kinds of purpose: Subjective being what the framers actually intended and Objective being what the provision itself is seeking o achieve. Kludze JSC in REPUBLIC V FAST TRACK HIGH COURT, ACCRA EX PARTE DANIEL (2001-02) SCGLR 620 said that ‘we cannot amend a piece of legislation because we dislike it or the law giver was mistaken or unwise. Our responsibility is greater when we interpret the constitution. We cannot and mustn’t substitute our wisdom for the collective wisdom of the framers of the constitution’.
Georgina Wood CJ in REPUBLIC V FAST TRACK HIGH COURT, ACCRA EX PARTE CHRAJ, HON. DR RICHARD ANANE, INTERESTED PARTY (2008) 4 GMJ 1 at 45 stated, in dismissing commissions application to quash decision from the HC, that ‘the purposive approach rule is however not a carte blanche for rewriting legislation, let alone our constitution, and should never be used to do so. The function of the court is to interpret legislation and give effect to it, even when the terms appear unpalatable. The word ‘complaint’ in Article 218(a) is limited to formal complaints made to the commission by an identifiable complainant; not necessarily the victim. CHRAJ cannot be the complainant, there must be one. The decision of Baffoe-Bonnie J to interpret the word complaint is quashed on the basis that only the SC has the jurisdiction to interpret provisions of the constitution but his quashing of the commission’s findings against Dr. Anane as amenable to judicial review upheld since’. Allegations of corruption and conflict of interest against Dr. Anane the then minister for health in NPP administration appearing in the newspaper and the CHRAJ investigated the matter and held him liable. He therefore applied to the HC for review he succeeded and CHRAJ also proceeded to the SC to quash the HC decisions.
Lord Reid in MAUNSELL V OLINS (1975) 1 ALL ER 16 at 18 said that the rules of interpretation are not rules in ordinary sense of having some binding force. They are our servants, not our masters. They are aids to construction: presumptions or pointers.
In KUENYEHIA V ARCHER (1993-93) 2GLR 525, SC, it was stated by Francois JSC that ‘a constitutional instrument is a document sui generis (unique) to be interpreted according to the principles suitable to its peculiar character and not necessarily according to the ordinary rules and presumptions of statutory interpretation’.
Acquah JSC in the case of NATIONAL MEDIA COMMISSION V ATTORNEY-GENERAL (2000) SGLR 1 says that ‘in interpreting the constitution, care must be taken to ensure that all the provisions work together as parts of a functioning whole. The parts must fit together logically to form a rational, internally consistent framework’.