Allodial is derived from the German word ‘olod’ or ‘allod’ meaning entire property from which was derived the mediaeval Latin word ‘allodium’ (allodium) which means an interest held of no-one, an absolute or original heritage. The allodial title is the highest quantum of interest or title that can be held and it cannot be extinguished or terminated. It means that this interest to land resides in the group as a whole, with the stool‘s occupant who is normally the chief, being the caretaker or trustee.
Nature and Location of the Allodial Title
There are mainly two forms of the Allodial Ownership: State Ownership and Family Ownership.
The State Ownership is prevalent in the Akan states such as Ashanti and Akyem. In these areas, the land in effect belongs to the state or to the whole community usually represented by the stool or its occupant. Thus in the words of Bentsi-Enchil, ownership of the land is vested in the state. This means that the land is attached to the paramount stool, or that it is the property of the whole community. In view of this, the basic principle in such areas is that allodial title to land within such a state can be transferred only by the paramount chief acting with consent and concurrence of his principal elders and councillors.
The second form of allodial ownership of land is common among the Ewes, Ga Adangbe and some parts of Northern Ghana. To them families own allodial title to land separate from stool lands. These lands are held in trust for the family members by the family head. Any transactions in such lands demand the consent and concurrence of family member before it can be regarded as valid.
Apart from the two major forms of allodial ownership cited above; the courts have also held that this form of ownership is possible of being vested in individuals and sub stools.
NYASEMHWE v AFIBIYESAN
The disputed land belonged to the plaintiff’s ancestors, which he inherited from his uncle after he died. He permitted Busumpra to farm on the land, without specifying the duration or type of licence. The defendants who were relatives of Busumpra trespassed on the land after Busumpra had died and he lodged a complaint with the chief HOLDING: the plaintiff possesses the allodial title to the disputed land. However, since he is not in exclusive possession of the land having permitted Busumpra to make a farm thereon; and since the late Busumpra’s usufructuary interest in the farm is now vested in possession of the defendants, his successors, the plaintiff’s action for damages for trespass is misconceived
JAMESTOWN (ALATA) STOOL v SEMPE STOOL
The court was called upon to determine as between the Sempe stool and the Alata stool, which stool had acquired the allodial title to the hitherto James Town lands. HOLDING: The allodial title is vested in the quarter which is in exclusive possession. REASON: The history of James Town shows clearly that three quarters constitute James Town, namely Akumajay, Alata and Sempe and that their “property” is vested in the James Town Mantse, per Akue v Ababio. Each quarter can however only claim ownership to an area which is in its exclusive possession. It will be wrong for any of the three stools to claim for itself the allodial title to all James Town lands. Thus the allodial title was held to vest in a substool.
In the Akan communities, the allodial is held by the Stool In non-Akan communities such as Ga and Ewe, land is held by families, not Stools, and in some societies of the Northern and Upper Regions, ‘land priests’ or tendamba control access to land as representatives of the lineages of ‘original settlers’.
If one considered a hierarchy of interests under the customary law, the allodial title occupies the apex. It is thus the highest interest you can hold in land under the customary regime.
There are authorities which have held that in certain parts of the country the allodial title is vested in customary communities called Stools. AKWEI v AWULETEY (MAMOBI-KOTOBABI-DZORWULU), KOTEI v ASERE STOOL. There are instances where the court has held that the allodial is vested in sub stools. JAMESTOWN (ALATA) STOOL v SEMPE STOOL, GYEABOUR II v ABABIO.
In other parts of the country the allodial title is vested in customary communities called Skins.
AZAMTILOW v NAYERI, SAAKA v DAHALI
the plaintiff/appellant sued for a declaration of title and recovery of possession to her late father‘s house in Tamale. HELD: the Court of Appeal held that the chief of Tamale rightly gave the land in question to the appellant’s father, Saaka Dagomba, to be built upon; for Saaka Dagomba being of the Dagomba tribe is entitled under Dagomba customary law to be given part of the land attached to the Dagomba skin for building purpose. Thus, once Saaka Dagomba has exercised this right and has built on it, he has a usufruct of that land which cannot without just cause be taken away from him by the skin. The land, now built on a plot of land, ceased to be vacant land attached to the skin.
The courts have further held that the allodial title can be vested in families.
AMOEDA v PORDIER.
In two consolidated actions by the plaintiff’s family for recovery of possession of land in Ningo, the plaintiff’s family alleged that the defendants were their licensees and were permitted to live on the land in dispute only as long as they continued to acknowledge the title of the plaintiff’s family. The defendants denied the title of the plaintiff’s family and asserted that title lay in the Ningo stool. The paramount chief of Ningo was accordingly joined to establish his stool’s title to the land. At the trial the defendant stool failed to adduced evidence asserting their ownership nonetheless judgment was given in their favor. HELD: The court held that, lands in Ningo were not stool lands but were owned by families or quarters and on the facts, the land in dispute belonged to the plaintiff’s family.
Individuals has also been held to be able to hold the Allodial title. NYASEMHWE v AFIBIYESAN.
GOLIGHTLY v. ASHIRIFI {KOKOMMLEMLE CONSLIDATED CASES.} (THE ALLODIAL TITLE OF KOKOMLEMLE LANDS ARE VESTED IN THE GBESE, GA AND KORLE STOOL.)
FACTS: The Okaikor Churu family were given the right to farm land at Kokomlemle by the Gbese stool and had been in possession of the land ever since 1875. In 1942, the Atukpai family, claiming to be owners of the land, sold it to purchasers who put up buildings on it. In 1943, the head of the Okaikor Churu family brought an action claiming, inter alia, declaration of title, and later on the Korle priest was joined as co-plaintiff. Held: that the allodial title to the lands were vested in the GBESE STOOL, KORLE STOOL AND THE GA STOOL. As such the claim of the Atukpai family was invalid. The Privy Council however noted that outright grant of the land was possible. That an outright alienation or sale of the lands can only be effected with the prior consent of the three stools, the Ga, Gbese and Korle stools, and that publicity is necessary in such transactions, the publicity being a safeguard provided by customary usage against the clandestine disposal of land without the knowledge of the necessary parties.
SASRAKU v DAVID
FACTS: The plaintiff sued as a representative of a family company. The plaintiffs were farmers from teshie. They institute the present action against the defendant for trespass on their land which the claimed to have obtain by absolute sale from the CHEWPAW STOOL with the consent of the kukufo paramount stool. The defendant claim to having obtain a right to fell the timber from the paramount stool. At trial the KUKUFO stool was added as co- defendant. They contended that under ASHANTI native law land was inalienable. The defendant appeal from the judgment of the trial judge. Short facts: the defendant was felling trees on the land of the plaintiff who claimed to have bought it outrightly from the chewpaw stool.
Held: the trial judge was right in holding that land was saleable in ASHANTI. Upon evidence adduced by the defendant there existed in Ashanti the TRAMMA which conveyed unto a person an absolute right to a land. This is what the plaintiff described as GAUHA. However, the title the plaintiff obtained was that of a usufruct as opposed to the allodial title held in the stool. Thus, the plaintiff were owners until they became extinct.
MECHANICAL LLOYD v NARTEY (LA)
Frafraha is a village forming part of the rural lands of La acquired by the La stool. This village was settled in by the Agbawe quarter. The plaintiff was alienated a piece of land by the Agbawe quarter for farming for which they registered. The La Stool land also alienated a piece of land which engulfed the plaintiff’s to the defendant company. The document on this one was not registered. The defendant also went to the Frafraha and Agbawe quarter on realizing they are the right persons to give out lands in that area for which they registered this deed. The plaintiff later sued for recovery of possession of the land.
HELD: The court held that the Frafraha lands were stool lands and that it was the La Mantse who is the proper authority to alienate or grant portions of La stool lands.
KWAMI v. QUANOR (OSU)
FACTS: The plaintiff appellant relying on an oral grant by the osu stool sues the respondent for trespass and an injunction to restrain them from encroaching on the land. The defendant claims to have inherited the land from the father who obtained a grant from the osu alata stool in relation to the same piece of land. The appeal was dismiss.
Held: The proper authority to grant Osu stool lands was the osu stool. The proper authority to grant quarter lands was the mantse of the quarter. The proper authority to grant unalienated outskirts land is the mantse of the quarter in consultation with his elders. However the osu mantse upon prior consultation with the quarter elders could do same. As the land in question was quarter land the alata quarter was the right authority to grant the land as such the plaintiff obtains no better title than the defendant.
AKWEI v AWULETEY (OSU)
The plaintiff, a subject of Osu claimed to get the disputed land from a deed of gift from the then Osu Mantse. The defendant claimed the land by virtue of a customary grant by the Osu Mankralo to which he claimed the land belonged. The Osu Mantse claimed the land belonged to the stool but the Mankralo contended the land belongs to the Ashanti Blohum Quarter of Osu and that any allocation required their consent.
Held: the court held that there are four quarters in Osu; Kinkawe, Ashanti Blohum, Alata and Anahor. All quarters have their own lands which are controlled by their headmen. Lands not within this quarter is under the Osu Mantse. The court found the land in dispute as neither a quarter land nor an outskirt land but an Osu rural land which only the Mantse with his elders can grant. He cannot however make a grant of an outskirt land.
MENSAH v. GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK (TESHIE)
FACTS: the plaintiff action is for a declaration of title of a parcel of land situated in Teshie. In an application for a reconveyance of the land and property thereon from the commercial bank the brother of the deceased husband contended that the land was the property of the family and that the plaintiff’s deceased husband received no deed of gift from the teshie stool. It was established at trial that there were pillars with the initials of the late father of the 2nd defendant on the parcel of land and as the said Mantse who made the conveyance was destooled.
Held: In teshie, the allodial title of lands resided in the stool but the quarters were the caretakers of the land. By custom grant must first be made by the quarter, thereafter confirmed by the teshie mantse and the appropriate elders. Any grant contrary to this is invalid. The authorized elders to confirm a grant of land is the mankralo, Ayoku wolume and the Shikitele.
INCIDENTS OR RIGHTS OF AN ALLODIAL TITLE HOLDER
Incidents refers to the bundle of rights which accrues to the holder of the allodial interest or for that matter any interest in land. It describes the rights of user and control that the holder of an interest in land can enjoy. The incidents include the following.
⦁ Exclusive Possession
As a concept, it denotes visible possibility of exercising physical control (corpus possession is i.e. direct control and indirect control of land) over a thing with intention (animus possedendi) of doing so to the exclusion of all others. It is presumed that although the owner may nay be in direct control i.e. physical control, he has the intention to hold on to the land.
⦁ Use and Enjoyment
This right gives the owner rights as how to use the land as well as the right of the law. ATTA v ESSON
⦁ Right of Alienation
It gives the presumption that the person who has the legal right or interest has the right to alienate i.e. ― nemo dat quod nan habet. The holder could either give: The whole/entire interest, a little/part of the interest, a lesser rights like share tenancy or customary license(s) and a lease.
⦁ Right of Proprietorship in Perpetuity
This right manifests itself most where the allodial interest is owned by a group rather than an individual as a group that never dies and is in perpetuity thus allowing for the enjoyment of this right. It was noted in Quarm v. Yankah II (1930) 1WACA p. 80 per Sir George Deane C.J. that ―…..The concept of the stool i.e., it has always been accepted in the courts of this colony is that it is an entity which never dies, the corporation sole, like the Crown, and that while the occupants of the stool may come and go, the stool goes on forever.
⦁ Right to Residual Proprietary Interest (Reversion)
The owners can have parallel rights in the land together with any other body to whom they have transferred some of the rights to. After the expiration of the term, the exclusive right to ownership comes back to them. E.g. they can grant a lease after which the land returns back to them.
ACQUISITION OF THE ALLODIAL TITLE
There are various ways in which the community acquires the allodial title in land. Ollennu J held in Ohimeng v Agyei that there are four main ways by which the allodial can be acquired. Danquah suggested two further modes of acquisition, namely foreclosure after a pledge or mortgage, and reacquisition of title by reversion from a grantee. Discovery followed by settlement appears to be the only original mode.
⦁ Conquest and subsequent settlement and cultivation by subjects of the stool
This method of acquisition is evidenced in a number of decisions. Ohimen v Adjei,
Edward Awuku v Bryne Yaw Attigah
The first claimant claimed that he acquired the land from his uncle who acquired it from the caretaker of maamobi lands. His conveyance was apparently confirmed by the Osu Mantse. HOLDING: The caretaker/headman of Maamobi lands had no authority to grant Osu Stool land, unless the Osu Mantse adopted or concurred in the grant later upon knowing the true facts. The transaction between the first claimant’s uncle & the caretaker was not ratified properly by the Osu Mantse, since the caretaker was listed as ‘donor’. REASON: The scope of those who may grant portions of Osu Stool lands is wide enough to include the Osu Mantse, and his elders including quarter headmen and caretakers. A reading of the cases will mean then that it is when the caretaker acts alone without the knowledge, consent and concurrence of the Osu Mantse, or when the Osu Mantse acts alone without his elders including the quarter headmen that the grant would be declared null and void.
Awulae Attibrukusu III v Oppong Kofi
The plaintiff was the chief of the Lower Axim Traditional Area belonging to the Royal Nvaviley Family of Lower Axim, who are the owners of the Lower Axim stool lands. The plaintiff, sought a declaration of title to the disputed land, damages for trespass & a perpetual injunction against the defendants because the defendants had alienated the disputed land which is their personal property to strangers without their consent. The plaintiff claimed that the ancestors of the defendants who were members of the royal family were given permission to farm on the disputed land. HELD: The court held that where members of a family migrate from one place to another and they are given land to settle, they are only entitled to the land given by them. If he claim land outside that area, then he is a trespasser. Settlors only have the usufruct and not the allodial
Nii Ago Sai v Nii Kpobi Tetteh Tsuru III
The plaintiff, Nii Kpobi was the occupant of the La stool and the defendant a subject of the stool was the headman of the Ogbojo village. The plaintiff sued for a declaration of title to all Ogbojo’s lands. He contended that the Ogbojo village was under the La Stool and as such, they became the property of the La stool by conquest many centuries ago. The defendant argued that their family owned the land by settlement. He contended that the Anahor and Jirase families founded and settled in the village and denied that the La stool owned the land. HELD: the court held that it is trite law that both conquest and settlement were legitimate customary means of acquiring an allodial title. From the evidence, the court held that the La stool did not have any rights of ownership of Ogbojo lands and as such, they were not part of the La rural lands. The allodial belongs to the Anahor and Jirase families.
Nyamekye v Ansah
Following a grant made by the 2nd defendant by the 1st defendant, the plaintiff sought a declaration to the effect that the granted land was the property of his branch of the royal family. The 2nd defendant, who was the chief, contended that all Kajebi lands belonged to the stool thus as stool occupant he had the authority to make the grant. He therefore counterclaimed for declaration of title to the land. The plaintiff led evidence to show that the founder of his branch of family was the first to cultivate the disputed land. Successor to the founder subsequently collected proceeds of the farm on the land. The trial judge held that the plaintiff had no capacity to sue, as she was neither chief nor family head whether the land was stool or family land. HOLDING: Since the plaintiff’s family had exercised ownership rights over the land in dispute and continued the exercise of those rights, the land had acquired the character of family land which the head of family with the concurrence of its members was entitled to occupy as family land. Also, the customary law position was that even though individuals and families might first cultivate on land it was the stool which first settled on the land that had the allodial title in the land. But any portion of unoccupied or vacant land which individual members of that community or tribe were able by their labour to reduce into their possession became the individual’s property, and land so occupied would belong to their families after the individual’s death. The interest that the individual or family would hold was the determinable or usufructuary estate in the land and it was concurrent with the existence of the absolute ownership in the stool.
⦁ Discovery by hunters or pioneers of the stool and subsequent settlement thereon and use thereof by the subjects of the stool.
Ngmati v Adetsia
FACTS: The plaintiff, a Yilo Krobo subject, brought an action against the defendants for trespass. The defendants asserted that all land at Okwenya belonged to the Konor of Manya Krobo thus the plaintiff’s ancestors could not have farmed the land, being Yilo Krobo subjects, not
HOLDING: That the plaintiff’s ancestors, like many other Krobos—Yilo as well as Manya—in ancient times farmed portions of the land at the foot of the Krobo Hill, and the land which the plaintiff’s ancestors so farmed is now the ancestral property of the plaintiff’s family., uk
REASON: Unoccupied land which is found about an area which a Stool settles upon, and which the subjects of the Stool cultivate, comes to be regarded as property of the Stool. But the portion which anyone so farmed also remains ancestral property for his descendant.
⦁ Contiguity – where there is unoccupied land between two paramount stools.
Wiapa v Solomon,
LOSS OF THE ALLODIAL
According to Woodman, the derivative modes of acquisition listed in the preceding section all involve loss of the allodial title by the previous owner. Thus sale, gift, foreclosure, estoppel and conquest are all modes whereby one owner losses the allodial title at the same time as another acquires its. Abandonment of the allodial title may also once have been a mode of loss. The allodial title may be lost through:
⦁ Effect of Legislation
The title may also be lost as a result of legislative enactment. In three instances holders of allodial titles have lost them or are liable to lose them as a result of legislation. First, Section 7(1) of the Administration of Land Act 1962 (Act 123).
NII NORTEY OMABOE v ATTORNEY GENERAL
FACTS: With the coming into force of the Accra-Tema City Stool Lands (Vesting Instrument, 1964) E.I 108, the Osu Mantse Layout, consisting of three parcels of land were vested in the president except one piece of land. The EI vested all stool lands in Accra and Tema in the president. Prior to the EI, the lands were vested in the stools but with the coming into force of the EI in 1974, the lands in dispute was automatically caught by the instruments. The plaintiff sued in the High Court for a declaration that the Osu Mantse Layout lapsed with the promulgation of the 1992 Constitution and as such, the lands were devested.
REASONING FROM COURT
The High Court judge, Mrs. Justice F Owusu Arhin referred the case to the Supreme Court for interpretation of article 267 of the 1992 Constitution on whether the vesting power of EI 108 has lapsed. The Supreme Court held as follows:
The combined effect of Articles 267, 257 and 258 of the 1992 Constitution gives a number of land holding policies: firstly, stool lands that had not been vested in the President or Government prior to January 7th 1993, that is, those stool lands properly envisaged under Article 267(1), continue to be duly vested in their respective stools in trust for the subjects of the stool in accordance with customary law and usage. Article 267(2) of the same Constitution directly establishes the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands whose functions are undoubtedly those of management, revenue collection and disbursement; and whose authority covers all stool lands. As such, there is no inconsistency between 267(1) and (2), for as already explained, the vesting of title in one party may go side by side with management functions being lodged in another entity. Nor is there any absurdity in the constitutional arrangement. Also, under Article 267(3), there is restriction placed on the right of the stool to dispose an interest in lands to another as it must conform with the development plan as well as with the consent of the Land Commission. Also, stools cannot create and transfer a freehold interest in stool lands to any person.
Secondly, lands that were once stool lands, but which had been vested in the president or government without any de-vesting in favor of the original stools by statute continue to be vested in the president until the state revokes it expressly to devest itself and revest back to the stool.
From Article 258(1)(a), there are three basic categories of lands entrusted to the management of the Lands Commission on behalf of the Government of Ghana: public lands, lands vested in the President by the Constitution or by any other law, and any lands vested in the Lands Commission itself. The distinction between public lands and lands vested in the president is to be seen in Article 257(2) and 258(1)(a). Article 257(1) vest all public lands in the president and both of these are held in trust for the people of Ghana. Both categories of land are expected to be managed by the Lands Commission. Therefore, the Osu Mantse Layout is under the Lands Commission and not the Office of Administration of stool lands.
Finally, lands with no stool origins or connections such as family or individual lands, but which become public lands by virtue of compulsory acquisition fall the Lands Commission management.
In conclusion, Article 267(1) do not de-vest the president or government of all lands which were once stool lands but had become so vested. Also, article 267(1) does not cover lands that were not stool lands on the coming into force of the 1992 constitution and as such, the vesting power of EI 108 has not lapsed.
⦁ Abandonment
Mensah v Asamoah: the plaintiff sues for trespass and a declaration for title for a parcel of land at Apragya. He claims to have derived his title from his predecessors who were granted the land by the Aduamoa stool. The defendant also claims the land was abandoned and as such was granted to him by the same stool. At trial and the high the court judgment was in the favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appeals. The appeal was allowed. Held: the land was not abandoned. The stranger grantee like the subject grantee had possessory interest which was inheritable. However, the stranger cannot alienate the land without the consent of the stool. If he died intestate the land reverted to the stool. Same in the case of abandonment. Land is said to be abandoned when if either the stranger was intransigent or had effectively and voluntarily abandoned the land over a considerable period of years without an intention of returning to it or had died intestate without a successor. The mere absence or death simpliciter of the stranger was not enough to constitute abandonment; there must be an intention to abandon and the fact of abandonment must co-exist with intention.
Nikoi Olai v Adams
⦁ Conquest
Owusu v Manche of Labadi
⦁ Adverse Possession under the Limitations Act, 1972 (NRCD 54), Section 10
⦁ Extinction by effect of constitutional provisions: Article 266(3), which converts existing freeholds held by non-citizens into leases for 50 years effective August 24, 1969. Issue is whether allodial title is the same as freehold?
⦁ Sale.
Golightly v Ashirifi
The plaintiff (Okaikor Churu family) had been given the right to farm on the Kokomlemle land by the Gbese Stool & the defendant (Atukpai family) claiming to be the owners of the land sold it to purchasers who started building on it. The plaintiff thus brought an action claiming a declaration to title and the Korle priest was later joined as a co-plaintiff.
HOLDING: The Atukpai family had no right to the land at all and the Korle family did have a right to it, not by itself alone, but only in conjunction with the two other stools, the Ga stool and the Gbese stool.
REASON: The plaintiff and her family are possessory (usufructuary) owners subject to the rights of the Ga and Gbese and Korle stools who are recognised by customary law as being the allodial owners of that land.
SASRAKU v DAVID
The plaintiff family claimed that they purchased the land from the Chempaw stool, a sub-stool of the Kokofu stool, with the consent of the Kokofu stool. The defendants also alleged that timber harvesting rights had been given to them by the Kokofu stool. The co-defendant, who was the chief of Kokofu argued that land was not saleable in Ashanti, & that the previous Chempaw headman & previous Kokofu chief had been destooled for collaborating in selling stool lands, therefore the sale was not done with the consent of the Kokofu Stool.
HOLDING: The plaintiff’s company is in possession of the said land as owners thereof by right of purchase under an absolute sale by guaha from the stool of Chempaw with the knowledge and consent of the Paramount Stool of the Kokofu State.
REASON: After the purchase, the plaintiff family had kept the boundaries of the land cut & kept the boundary mark clear. They had not paid any tribute, rents or tolls. It was known that the former Omanhene had in fact assented to other sales of land & also that he and the Odikro of Chempaw had collaborated in selling lands. By reason of these various circumstances it was reasonable and permissible for the court to interfere and to arrive at the conclusion that have had been knowledge in the consent by the Paramount Stool.
⦁ Compulsory Acquisition
In compulsory acquisition the allodial title is extinguished. However, vesting does not extinguish the allodial title. The effects of vesting is in Nana Hyeaman II v Osei
The plaintiff brought an action for the setting aside of a timber lease of a parcel of land attached to his stool. Defendants raised a preliminary objection to the capacity of the plaintiff on grounds that by virtue of the Concessions Act only the president could institute proceedings on behalf of the stools concerned. S16 of Act 124 vested lands to be constituted as foreign reserves in the president & also vested all rights with respect to timber. HELD: The vesting of stool lands that are subject to concessions in the president does not remove the stool’s inherent rights to own property. The statutory powers of the President ought to be construed as running side by side with the powers of the stools as the allodial owners of stool lands.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY INTERVENTIONS IN THE INCIDENTS OF THE ALLODIAL TITLE
“Man cannot always be allowed by society to be complete master of what he calls his own, and that he must submit to the restrictions placed by the law upon the exercise of his proprietary rights.” There are a number of interventions by the 1992 Constitution and statutory law placed on the allodial title. For example:
i) Constitutional provisions on prohibition of certain grants by stools.
⦁ Article 267(5) prohibits grants of freehold in stool lands.
ii) Constitutional provisions governing restrictions on grants to persons who are not citizens of Ghana.
⦁ Article 266(1)-(5).
iii) Constitutional provisions on the vesting of minerals in their natural state in the president on behalf of and in trust for the people of Ghana.
⦁ Article 257(6)
iii) Constitutional provisions subjecting grants of concessions or right for the exploitation of any mineral or natural resource to parliamentary ratification.
⦁ Article 268.
268. (1) Any transaction, contract or undertaking involving the grant of a right or concession by or on behalf of any person including the Government of Ghana, to any other person or body of persons howsoever described, for the exploitation of any mineral, water or other natural resource of Ghana made or entered into after the coming into force of this Constitution shall be subject to ratification by Parliament.
(2) Parliament may, by resolution supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the members of Parliament, exempt from the provisions of clause (1) of this article any particular class of transactions, contracts or undertakings.
⦁ See proviso for exemptions to be made by Parliament. Article 269(2).
iii) Constitutional provisions governing the receipt and allocation of revenue from stool lands.
⦁ Article 267(1) and Article 267(6).
⦁ See also the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands Act, 1994 (Act 481), SS. 2 & 7.
iii) Legislation relating to timber, minerals and petroleum.
⦁ Concessions Act, 1962 (Act 124), as amended by the Timber Resources Management Act, 1997 (Act 547), S.1.
⦁ Minerals and Mining Law 1986, (PNDCL 153), s.1.
⦁ Petroleum Exploration & Production Law, 1983 (PNDCL 68), s.1.
⦁ Legislation relating to Planning and Zoning, e.g. Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) S. 49, 52, 53, 54 and 55.
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INFLUENCES ON THE ALLODIAL TITLE
⦁ Economic and technological developments leading to the new and intensive uses of land.
⦁ The emergence of the customary law freehold.
⦁ The extension of the governmental authority in land administration.
⦁ Changes in the nature, structure and organisation of customary communities and particularly traditional notions and structure of the family.