What is Estoppel by acquiescence?
The Doctrine of Acquiescence arises in situations of passive encouragement and active encouragement.
In Ramsden v. Dyson Lord Cranworth LC explained that if a stranger begins to build on another’s land supposing it to be his own, and the owner, perceiving his mistake, abstain from setting him straight and leave him to persevere in his error, a court of Equity will not allow the owner to assert his title on the land which the stranger has spent money to improve.
In Dilwyn v. Llewellyn, Lord Westbury LC explained that where A tells B “I give you this land that you may build a house on it”, and B on the strength of that promise, with the knowledge of A, expends a lot of money in building a house, there is no doubt that B acquires a right to call on A to perform the contract and complete the promise.
The main ingredients of this doctrine found in Wilmot v. Barber are:
1. P must have made a mistake as to his legal rights;
2. P must have spent money or done some act or suffered some detriment due to the mistaken belief;
3. D, the owner of the legal title, must know that his rights are inconsistent with the right claimed by P. The Doctrine of Acquiescence is founded upon conduct with knowledge of your legal rights;
4. D, the owner of the legal title, must know of P mistaken belief. If he does not know, there is nothing which calls upon him to assert his own rights;
5. D must have encouraged P in his expenditure or other acts, either directly or by not asserting his legal right.
This Doctrine is based on fraud. Thus, according to Fry J in Wilmot v. Barber, a man will not be deprived of his legal right unless he has acted fraudulently in setting up those rights.
To invoke this doctrine successfully, one has to establish all the conditions stated above. The first element to be considered is the P’s mistaken belief. In incurring expenditure or altering his position for the worse, P should have been laboring under the delusion that he owned the interest.
In Pilling v. Armatage Lord Grant MR explained that it should be a case where the act is done under the influence of a mistake. Therefore, if P has full knowledge of the facts and the true state of affairs relating to the land the Doctrine will not apply in his favor.
In Derrick v. Mohammed the defendant could not rely on the Doctrine because he knew that he was encroaching on land that was not his. Section 25 of the land registry act and PNDCL 152 states that registration constitutes actual notice for all purposes.
For the duty to correct the mistaken belief to arise, the rightful owner must be aware of his or her own interest in the property. Secondly the rightful owner must be aware of the mistaken belief of the other party. Generally, the duty arises from when the wrongful developer starts to do something on the land that is how or when the rightful owner becomes aware of the adverse claim by the wrongful owner and it is only at this time that the duty to correct the mistaken belief arises. The belief or delusion of the developer must have been induced and sustained by the owner, his agent or predecessor in title. There should be some form of encouragement.
Where the P fails to establish that either by language, conduct, silence or inaction he was encouraged, or his activities were even acquiesced in by the owner, he would not succeed. There should therefore be active or passive encouragement.
Such encouragement was given in McClurg v. Rogers et al, where in an action to enforce payment of a loan secured with the property of Ps father-in-law, it became evident that the father-in-law permitted P to build his house on one portion of the property. The property was built by Ps father-in-law with P’s materials. The court found that expenditure of money on the land under an expectation encouraged by the father-in-law that he would be able to live there, gave rise to the equity conferring a license on the P. The owner cannot be said to have encouraged where he does not know of his interest and that the acts of the developer were incompatible with his rights. For the element of fraud which induces the Chancellor to intervene is not present. This lack of such knowledge on the owner was one of the grounds on which the defendant’s plea of acquiescence failed in Derrick v. Mohammed. P did not know that D’s building was encroaching on his land. D, however, did know that he was encroaching on land that was not his, but he did not know that the land belonged to P, who succeeded in an action to recover the land with the improvement developed by the defendant.
The next condition requires P to establish that on the faith of the representation he has acted to his detriment or altered his position for the worse. This was emphasized in Greasley v. Cooke. In this case, Doris Cooke relied on the encouragement of her late concubine and his brother, the plaintiff, to believe that she could regard the property as her home for the rest of her life. The Court of Appeal held that she could not be ejected. Her reliance detriment was foregoing wages and lost of opportunity for a job. The expenditure and detriment can take any form, provided it was suffered on the faith of some representation.
Even if the expenditure results in some improvement of the owner’s land, as it happened in Ives Investment Ltd. v. High the Doctrine can be invoked. There is no obligation to correct mistaken belief unless he has done something to the land. There must be a link between the mistaken belief and the acting on the land.
This means that for a defendant to be able to plead estoppel, he or she must prove three things/ there are three elements of estoppel:
1. The person seeking to rely on estoppel, or the developer must have acted on the basis of mistaken belief
2. The rightful owner being aware of the mistaken belief failed to correct the mistaken belief.
3. The developer (the person who has acted on the basis of het mistaken belief) develops the land as a consequence of the mistaken belief.
So how can a person discharge this duty?
• Obviously court action
• Physical self-help
• Writing to the person, land guards etc.
Consequences of estoppel
⦁ It operates as a conveyance of the interest of the rightful owner to the wrongful claimant
⦁ It operates between original parties as well as their successors. Even if the rightful owner has passed on his interest before litigation began
Amonoo v dee
Facts-the plf’s grand uncle purchased land and entered into possession and planted foodstuffs. The grand uncle had died some thirty years ago and the plf was the successor to the property. The def started breaking and entering to pluck cocoa and after several protest the plf brought an action in court. The def contended that the whole area was the property of his ancestor.
Held: Sowah-Where a person had occupied a piece of land under a mistaken belief that that was the land he had purchased and he invested in it what appeared to be the most valuable investment, alienated a portion thereof, all to the knowledge of the defendant, the possessor of the legal rights, who took no steps to vindicate his title or at least to inform the plaintiff occupier of his mistaken belief that the property he had purchased was not the land he was occupying, the defendant’s conduct would amount to fraud, and the court would be entitled to restrain the defendant from setting up his legal rights and exercise its discretion in favour of the plaintiff
Wordie v awudu bukari
Facts- he plf was granted a piece of kokolemle land by the osu stool and entered into possession. Later the def was granted a conveyance of the same land by the korle priest. The def entered a portion of the land and erected a fence on it. Held- The second appellants did not know their northern boundary. It was Jackson J. who determined it for them by drawing the line AAAA. Before the consolidated suits (supra) were commenced before Jackson J., the first appellant was already in possession and occupation of the land claimed by him. Nobody appears to have disturbed his occupation or possession. The area was bush and the second appellants did not bother to eject him. Although the land was subsequently adjudged to belong to the second appellants, the first appellant genuinely believed that he was in possession of the area by a valid grant from the Osu stool. From 1935 to 1967 when the second appellants joined in the present suit, the first appellant remained in possession without molestation or challenge from the three stools. Thirty-two years is a long period indeed for a man to sleep on his legal rights.
Kwarteng v addow
Facts- The property originally belonged to one Moro Braimah. He apparently offered it for sale to the defendant herein; however the evidence shows that he refused to execute the necessary conveyance in favour of the defendant who therefore instituted an action for specific performance. While that action was pending, Moro Braimah offered the property for sale to the plaintiff. Moro Braimah disclosed to him that he owed the defendant an amount of ¢3,000 “on the building.” The evidence suggests that Braimah and the defendant had come to an agreement that if the sum of ¢3,000 was paid to him, he, the defendant, would relinquish his interest in the property and discontinue the action in court. The plaintiff contacted Braimah’s solicitor as directed, in Accra. The solicitor asked the plaintiff to pay an amount of ¢4,267 and then “go and take the property.” The plaintiff duly paid this to the solicitor and obtained the necessary receipt. Held- the plaintiff was an innocent purchaser for value without notice. Moreover, the defendant’s conduct in standing by without any protest would have encouraged any reasonable person to believe that he had either abandoned his interest in the property or that he had no interest in it. The defendant was consequently also estopped from laying adverse claims to the property because as soon as the defendant became aware that the plaintiff was renovating the existing property and reconstructing the uncompleted one he should have warned her that he still maintained his interest in the land
Ado v wusu
Facts- The native custom in such a case is clear and undoubted, namely that the ultimate ownership remains in the original owner for all time. The only question is whether in this case the Plaintiff should be estopped from asserting that ownership owing to the Defendant having been led during his 200 years’ occupation to regard the land as his and so to spend money in improving it or in defending his rights to it and that he spent money in improving the land, in that he has constructed a motor road to Buoyem
Held- the native custom as to the resting place of the ultimate ownership would be well known to the Defendant and his people, but they could not be expected to rely on the English doctrine of estoppel to defeat the undisputed ownership of the Plaintiff. Such expenditure may legitimately be regarded as having been incurred in improving the value of the land, but since the road was constructed entirely for the benefit of the people occupying the land it cannot be claimed that it was the landlord’s responsibility, or that the Defendant incurred this expense as a result of his belief that he was the owner of the land